Research

I’m writing a dissertation on the concept of conscious experience, arguing that our 'third-personal' understanding of conscious experience follows from/is part of our 'first-personal' understanding.

Recent and Upcoming Talks

Apr 12
Pacific APA

Strange Experience: Why Experience Without Access Makes No Sense

Jun
The Science of Consciousness Conference

The Mental Measurement Problem: The Frictionless Epistemology of Conceptual Dualism

Jun
The Society for Philosophy and Psychology

The Mental Measurement Problem: The Frictionless Epistemology of Conceptual Dualism

Current Work

Strange Experience: Why Experience Without Access Makes No Sense

I introduce a challenge to the view that thinking about minds in a first-personal, how-it-feels way is cleanly separable from thinking about minds in a third-personal, how-it-works way. To show this, I discuss the ‘contrapositive’ of widely-discussed zombie cases: phenomenology without function (rather than function without phenomenology.)

The Mental Measurement Problem: The Frictionless Epistemology of Conceptual Dualism

I try to show how a conceptual gap between first-personal data and third-personal data leads to insurmountable methodological difficulties for a science of mind.

(Draft available on request.)

The Conceptual Interaction Problem: The Impossible Metaphysics of Conceptual Dualism

I try to show how a conceptual gap between the functional and the phenomenal makes any metaphysical link between the two unintelligible. In short, we run into a conceptual interaction problem that mirrors the old, familiar substance interaction problem.

(Draft in progress.)