Research

I’m writing a dissertation on the concept of conscious experience, arguing that our 'first-personal' understanding of conscious experience is continuous with our 'third-personal' understanding.

Recent and Upcoming Talks

Apr 12
Pacific APA

Strange Experience: Why Experience Without Access Makes No Sense

Jun
The Science of Consciousness Conference

The Mental Measurement Problem: The Frictionless Epistemology of Conceptual Dualism

Jun
The Society for Philosophy and Psychology

The Mental Measurement Problem: The Frictionless Epistemology of Conceptual Dualism

Current Work

Strange Experience: Why Experience Without Access Makes No Sense

I introduce a challenge to the view that thinking about minds in a first-personal, how-it-feels way is cleanly separable from thinking about minds in a third-personal, how-it-works way. To show this, I discuss the ‘contrapositive’ of widely-discussed zombie cases: phenomenology without function (rather than function without phenomenology.)

Take my super short Strange Experience Survey to log your intuitions about my central test case. (Or see the results).

The Mental Measurement Problem: The Frictionless Epistemology of Conceptual Dualism

I try to show how a conceptual gap between first-personal data and third-personal data leads to insurmountable methodological difficulties for a science of mind.

(Draft available on request.)

The Conceptual Interaction Problem: The Impossible Metaphysics of Conceptual Dualism

I try to show how a conceptual gap between the functional and the phenomenal makes any metaphysical link between the two unintelligible. In short, we run into a conceptual interaction problem that mirrors the old, familiar substance interaction problem.

(Draft in progress.)