

# Jackson Kernion

## CONTACT

jacksonkernion@gmail.com · <http://jacksonkernion.com>

## AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Epistemology

## AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics, Early Modern

## Employment

**Harvard College** · Web Developer (Part-Time) 2020-2021  
Updating legacy web app (<http://deductivelogic.org>), from PHP/jQuery/mysql to SvelteKit/mongoDB

**MIT** · Postdoctoral Associate SPRING 2020  
Taught a lecture course with 70+ students, and managed 3 teaching assistants

## Education

**UC Berkeley** · Ph.D, Philosophy 2020

DISSERTATION: *Constraining Consciousness*

Philosophers regularly commit themselves to a conceptual distinction between phenomenal experience and functional architecture. But this is a mistake. It generates a series of unsatisfying, intractable debates, and creates insurmountable methodological difficulties for a science of consciousness. We can't make sense of experiences *as* experiences unless they meet certain functional constraints. This much can be demonstrated by considering test cases that keep the phenomenal facts fixed while 'zeroing out' or altering the functional facts, cases that are an inversion of the classic absent qualia and inverted qualia thought experiments. The result is a modest form of conceptual functionalism that reconciles competing dualist and physicalist intuitions.

COMMITTEE: John Campbell, Geoffrey Lee, Tania Lombrozo (Psychology)

**New York University** · Visiting Ph.D Student 2018-2019  
FACULTY SPONSOR: David Chalmers

**Harvard College** · A.B. *cum laude*, Philosophy 2012  
Certificate in Mind, Brain, and Behavior

## Presentations

### REFEREED

**Making Room for Modest Conceptual Functionalism** JUN 2018  
Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness

**The Mental Measurement Problem** JUN 2017  
The Society for Philosophy and Psychology

**The Mental Measurement Problem** JUN 2017  
The Science of Consciousness Conference

**Strange Experience: Why Experience Without Access Makes No Sense** APR 2017  
Pacific APA

DEPARTMENTAL EVENTS

**General Intelligence, The Very Idea** MAY 2020  
Work In Progress Lunch (MIT)

**Defending Modest Conceptual Functionalism** MAR 2019  
Work In Progress Lunch (NYU)

**Strange Experience** OCT 2018  
Philosophy of Mind Group (NYU, Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness)

**Dissonant Qualia** OCT 2018  
Washington Square Circle (NYU, Weekly Grad Student Talk)

**The Mental Measurement Problem** OCT 2018  
Mind Research Group (Rutgers)

**Phenomenal Residue and Phenomenal Realism** MAY 2018  
The Dennes Lectures on Mind (UC Berkeley, Semi-Annual Workshop)

**Making Room for Modest Conceptual Functionalism** APR 2018  
Richard Wollheim Society (UC Berkeley, Weekly Grad Student Talk)

**The Case for Austere Conceptual Functionalism** SEP 2017  
Richard Wollheim Society

**The Mental Measurement Problem** FEB 2017  
Work In Progress Lunch (UC Berkeley, Weekly Departmental Event)

**The Conceptual Interaction Problem** JAN 2017  
Richard Wollheim Society

**Strange Experience** SEP 2016  
Phil Forum (UC Berkeley, Undergraduate Organization)

**The Mental Measurement Problem** SEP 2016  
Richard Wollheim Society

**Strange Experience** APR 2016  
The Dennes Lectures on Mind

**P- vs. A-Consciousness: A Methodological Puzzle** OCT 2015  
Richard Wollheim Society

**The Core of Wittgenstein's On Certainty** DEC 2014  
Phil Forum

**Do Experiences Immediately Justify External-World Beliefs?** DEC 2014  
Richard Wollheim Society

**Can Illusions Look Illusory?** APR 2013  
Richard Wollheim Society

**How We Make Emotions** OCT 2012  
Richard Wollheim Society

COMMENTS

**Complex Thought and Private Language** JAN 2018  
Sebastian Grève · Eastern APA

<b>How Does Acausal Physics Underwrite Special Science Causation?</b> Alexander Franklin · Berkeley-London Conference	MAY 2017
<b>Can Matching Systems Contribute To a Solution of the Refugee Crisis?</b> Philippe van Basshuysen · Berkeley-London Conference	MAY 2016

## Teaching

AS PRIMARY INSTRUCTOR (MIT)

Minds and Machines SPRING 2020

AS GRADUATE STUDENT INSTRUCTOR (UC BERKELEY & NYU)

History of Early Modern Philosophy (NYU) · *Tim Maudlin* SPRING 2019

The Nature of Mind · *John Campbell* SPRING 2018

Metaphysics · *Geoffrey Lee* FALL 2016

Modern Philosophy · *Hannah Ginsborg* SPRING 2016

Philosophical Methods · *Barry Stroud* FALL 2015

The Nature of Mind · *Umrao Sethi* SUMMER 2015

Knowledge & Its Limits · *John Perry* SPRING 2015

Theory of Knowledge · *Barry Stroud* FALL 2014

Introduction to Logic · *Daniel Warren* SPRING 2014

The Nature of Mind · *John Campbell* FALL 2013

Philosophy of Mind · *Paul Skokowski* SUMMER 2013

## Service

AI Reading Group (NYU) · *Co-Organizer* 2018-2019  
With Robert Long, organized a reading group for grad students and faculty

Dennes Lectures on Mind · *Lead Organizer* 2018  
Organized semi-annual research workshop, for UC Berkeley's philosophy of mind community

Philosophy of Mind Group · *Founder, Co-Organizer* 2016-2018  
With Greyson Abid, started a reading/working group for grad students and faculty

GSI Assignment Committee · *Lead Organizer* 2015-2017  
Lead an effort to revise the system by which GSIs are assigned, move it online

Prospective Graduate Student Visit · *Co-Organizer* 2013, 2014

Faculty Meetings · *Grad Student Co-Representative* 2013, 2015, 2017

## Graduate Studies

QUALIFYING EXAMS 2014-2015

P- vs. A-Consciousness: A Methodological Puzzle · *Geoffrey Lee*

How Perceptual Experiences Justify External World Beliefs · *John Campbell*

Concepts and Correctness · *Barry Stroud*

COURSEWORK (\* = Audited)

Why Is There Anything Except Physics?*	· Shamik Dasgupta & Geoffrey Lee	SPRING 2018
Causation and Perception*	· John Campbell	SPRING 2017
Topics in Philosophy of Perception*	· Geoffrey Lee	SPRING 2017
Objective and Subjective in Experience*	· Michael Martin	FALL 2016
Learning By Thinking*	· Tania Lombrozo	FALL 2016
Some Varieties of Mental Causation*	· John Campbell	SPRING 2016
Space, Time, and Consciousness*	· Geoffrey Lee	FALL 2015
Does the Mind Have a Causal Structure?*	· John Campbell	FALL 2014
Later Wittgenstein*	· Barry Stroud	SPRING 2014
Time, Experience, and Mental Representation	· Geoffrey Lee	FALL 2013
Aristotle's Physics I	· Timothy Clarke	FALL 2013
Foundations of Cognition*	· Tania Lombrozo & Tom Griffiths	FALL 2013
Metaphysics	· Barry Stroud	SPRING 2013
Theory of Meaning	· John MacFarlane	SPRING 2013
Reasons and Normativity	· Jay Wallace	SPRING 2013
Perceptual Attention, Disorders, & the First Person	· John Campbell	SPRING 2013
Spinoza	· Tim Crockett	FALL 2012
Art and the Limits of Neuroscience	· Alva Noë	FALL 2012
First-Year Graduate Seminar	· Hannah Ginsborg & John MacFarlane	FALL 2012

## References

David Chalmers  
NYU  
chalmers@nyu.edu

Geoffrey Lee  
UC Berkeley  
geoffrey\_lee@berkeley.edu

Carlos Montemayor  
SFSU  
cmontema@sfsu.edu